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The paper begins with a description of a grey seal performing con-
specific infanticide. The paper then gives an account of “nobleness” 
and “brutishness.” Roughly, a behavioural-disposition is noble/brut-
ish if it is one that would be a moral virtue/vice if the possessor of the 
behavioural-disposition were a moral agent. The paper then advances 
two pairs of axiological claims. The first pair of claims is that noble-
ness is good and that brutishness is bad. The second pair of claims is 
about an axiological interaction between nobleness/brutishness and 
well-being. That any non-human animal lacks well-being is bad. Yet, 
it is worse that a noble non-human animal lacks well-being, and not 
so bad that a brutish non-human animal lacks well-being. Lastly, the 
paper discusses some potential moral implications of these axiologi-
cal claims, for instance that factory farming is especially wrong be-
cause it causes noble non-human animals to lack well-being.
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Introduction1
“On the 2nd December 2014 an adult male grey seal 
was seen catching a weaned grey seal pup on the Isle 
of May. The pup was presumed weaned due to its close 
proximity to other pups of similar age and the absence 
of adult females without pups in the immediate vi-
cinity. It held the pup by the scruff of the neck and 
dragged it to a shallow freshwater pool. The adult then 
climbed on top of the pup, forced its head under water 
and held it until its struggles subsided. The male seal 
then proceeded to bite the back of the neck and simul-
taneously pull back with its head while pushing away 
with his fore flipper. This caused the skin to tear and 
caused the blubber layer along the line of the tear to de-
tach from the underlying body musculature. The study 
male then forced his lower jaw under the lip of the tear, 
biting down on the skin and then pulling back from 
the wound before swallowing several small sections of 
blubber and skin… The process from the capture event 
to the discarding of the carcass lasted approximately 
41 minutes… Over the next six days the male was ob-
served catching four more weaned pups and killing 
them using a similar method. This resulted in similar 
wounds and in each case the male ate a quantity of 
blubber… In addition, a further three pup carcasses 
with similar wounds were retrieved… Over an 11 day 
period an additional six pup carcasses were retrieved 
1 For their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article, my thanks to 
Connor Kianpour, to the anonymous reviewers, and to the participants at a 
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from a tide channel adjacent to the freshwater pools.” 
(Brownlow et al. 2016, 4–5) 
This paper discusses what properties we may correctly at-
tribute to non-human animals such as this grey seal, the value 
of those properties, and the moral significance of the value of 
those properties for various human practices that affect non-
human animals. The first section of the paper, drawing on some 
little-discussed passages from Aristotle, gives an account of 
nobleness and brutishness. Roughly, a behavioural-disposi-
tion is noble if it is a behavioural-disposition that would be 
a moral virtue if the possessor of the behavioural-disposition 
were a moral agent, and a behavioural-disposition is brutish 
if it is a behavioural-disposition that would be a moral vice 
if the possessor of the behavioural-disposition were a moral 
agent. Brutishness (theriotes) is a term used by Aristotle. Aris-
totle introduces no term for the opposite property, though A.M 
MacIver writes briefly of non-human animals as having “noble 
impulses” (MacIver 1948, 67). Nobleness is a term that may 
have various connotations, as is the other term I considered us-
ing for this property, “sweetness.” I ask the reader to put aside 
these connotations. 
The second section of the paper advances two pairs of axi-
ological claims. The first pair of claims is (i) that nobleness is 
good and (ii) that brutishness is bad. The second pair of claims 
is about an axiological interaction between brutishness or 
nobleness and well-being. That any non-human animal lacks 
well-being is bad. I argue (iii) that a non-human animal lacks 
well-being and is noble is even worse than if that non-human 
animal lacked well-being and were not noble, and (iv) that a 
non-human animal lacks well-being and is brutish is not as bad 
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as if that non-human animal lacked well-being and were not 
brutish. 
On most moral theories these axiological claims have moral 
implications for human practices that affect non-human ani-
mals. Without committing to any particular moral theory, the 
third section of the paper uses a simple form of consequential-
ism as a model moral theory for the purposes of illustration. On 
this model, (i) and (ii) alter the moral reasons we have for mak-
ing conservation efforts, (iii) adds an additional moral reason 
to refrain from practices that cause noble non-human animals 
to lack well-being, such as factory farming, and (iv) lessens the 
moral reason we have to refrain from practices that cause brut-
ish non-human animals to lack well-being, such as (perhaps) 
fox hunting. 
Brutishness and Nobleness
We regularly use terms of virtue and vice to describe non-
human animals (token individuals or types) and their behav-
ioural-dispositions, e.g. “That macaque is greedy,” “Beavers 
are diligent,” “The infant mammal’s mother is very generous to 
it,” “Your dog is aggressive and irascible, but my dog is gentle 
and patient.” What should we make of the use of these terms? 
Are they literal attributions of virtue and vice, or attributions of 
some other properties?
On traditional views of virtue and vice, to have a virtue or 
a vice requires having the cognitive or volitional capacity re-
quired for moral agency, e.g., prudential reason (phronesis) 
(Aristotle 2011, 1145a), or being able to act from the representa-
tion of duty (Kant 2015, 5:82). Plausibly, almost all non-human 
animals do not have this capacity. Accordingly, on traditional 
understandings, the use of terms of virtue and vice in relation 
Marcus Hunt
74
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 24, Issue 1
to non-human animals are seen as metaphorical (Aristotle 2011, 
1150a) or figurative (Kant 1997, 27:46). The extant sketches of 
this approach seem incomplete in that they do not help us dis-
tinguish between the sense in which a tidal wave is murder-
ous and the sense in which the grey seal described above is 
murderous. Granting that both attributions are metaphorical or 
figurative, the latter comes much closer to the literal attribution 
of murderousness that might be made of a normal adult human 
being.
More revisionary views of moral agency agree that some 
cognitive or volitional capacity is required for moral agency, 
but suggest accounts of what this capacity is that plausibly 
some non-human animals do have, e.g., sensitivity to certain 
sorts of value (Sapontzis 1987), responsiveness to certain sa-
lient features of a situation (Clark 1984), having certain senti-
ments (Waller 1998; De Waal 2006), or sensitivity to certain 
social norms (Bekoff and Pierce 2009) (for a summary of these 
views see Clement 2013). On these views, some uses of vir-
tue and vice terms for non-human animals might be literal at-
tributions of vice and virtue and other uses metaphorical or 
figurative. However, this seems lacking. Various insects mate 
by traumatic insemination (in which the female’s abdomen is 
pierced by the male’s reproductive organ). Plausibly, these in-
sects lack the capacities list above, so to say that they have a 
vice like violence would be metaphorical or figurative. Grant-
ing that this is so, we nevertheless want to distinguish between 
the sense in which such insects are violent and the sense in 
which the tidal wave is violent. 
Another view in the vicinity is that of Mark Rowlands who 
argues that some non-human animals, although not moral 
agents, are moral subjects in that they have “morally laden emo-
Marcus Hunt
75
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 24, Issue 1
tions [which] motivate animals to act by providing reasons for 
those actions” (Rowlands 2012, 35). It is not clear that our use of 
vice and virtue terms tracks moral subjecthood any more than 
it tracks moral agenthood. It is hard to say which non-human 
animals do or do not have morally laden emotions. Yet, sup-
posing that traumatic insemination behaviour is engaged in by 
insects that do not have morally laden emotions, it still seems 
like there is a difference between the sense in which they are 
violent and the sense in which the tidal wave is violent.  
Some remarks by Aristotle suggest a path forward. Our use 
of terms of virtue and vice is ambivalent. As made of most 
humans they are literal attributions. As made of non-human 
animals they are attributions of the related properties of brut-
ishness and nobleness. Such attributions are still metaphorical 
or figurative uses of terms of virtue and vice but come much 
closer to being literal attributions of virtue and vice than the 
attributions made of the tidal wave.
Aristotle’s account of brutishness is very brief and there is 
very little secondary literature on his account (Thorp 2003; 
Curzer 2012). I note what Aristotle says here simply to intro-
duce ideas which I will then develop in my own way, rather 
than as a piece of Aristotle scholarship. Aristotle says:
“Someone who is by nature such as to be afraid of ev-
erything, even if a mouse makes a noise, is a coward 
whose cowardice is brutish… some who are irrational 
as a result of nature and live by sense perception alone, 
like certain tribes of distant barbarians, are brutish.” 
(Aristotle 2011, 1149a)
“brutishness is a lesser thing than vice, even though 
it is more frightening, for the better part [of the soul] 
Marcus Hunt
76
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 24, Issue 1
has not been ruined in the case of a brute animal, as it 
has been in a human being who is vicious; rather, the 
brute animal does not have that better part.” (Aristotle 
2011, 1150a)
It seems that for Aristotle brutishness concerns those behav-
ioural-dispositions that would be vices if they could be regu-
lated by “that better part.” According to Aristotle, non-human 
animals lack that better part, and some humans lack that better 
part (such as certain tribes of distant barbarians), and some hu-
mans have that better part but for some reason it is unable to 
regulate certain of their behavioural-dispositions (such as the 
person who is afraid of everything, who presumably suffers 
from a mental illness). 
I suggest that virtue and vice terms as used of non-human 
animals are in fact attributions of the properties of nobleness 
and brutishness. I define noble properties as such: 
(1) a behavioural-disposition of some being, (2) that 
would be a moral virtue for that being, (3) if that be-
ing had the capacity required for moral agency, (4) and 
if that capacity were able to regulate the behavioural-
disposition. 
I define brutish properties in an equivalent way except that 
we replace (2) with:
(2*) that would be a moral vice for that being 
Imagine the scenario in which grey seals had the capacity 
required for moral agency and that capacity was able to regulate 
all of their behavioural-dispositions (they did not suffer from 
mental illness, etc.) In that scenario, the behavioural-disposi-
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tion of the token grey seal described above, towards killing and 
cannibalizing seal pups, would very plausibly be a vice. It is an 
example of a behavioural-disposition that the capacity required 
for moral agency should dissipate and suppress – through ha-
bituation, education, socialization, and the like. As a rough 
thought experiment for tracking nobleness and brutishness, we 
can think about whether a society of the rational equivalent of 
these species should prescribe or proscribe the behavioural-
disposition in question. It seems clear that a society of ratio-
nal grey seals should proscribe the killing and cannibalizing 
of seal pups. Put otherwise, normal adult human beings have 
behavioral-dispositions that would simply be noble or brutish, 
but for our having the capacity for moral agency which makes 
these things into virtues and vices. Where we find that our ca-
pacity for moral agency is unable to regulate the behavioural-
disposition in question, we in fact have noble and brutish traits. 
On this account, what our use of virtue and vice terms vis-
à-vis non-human animals pick out is nobleness and brutishness. 
Non-living phenomena like tidal waves cannot count as noble 
or brutish because they do not have behavioural-dispositions. 
Animals, whether insects or grey seals, can count as noble or 
brutish because they do have behavioral-dispositions, including 
those of the kind that would count as virtues or vices. I now of-
fer some clarifications about nobleness and brutishness to fore-
stall potential misunderstandings and objections.  
First, which behavioural-dispositions count as noble or brut-
ish is relative to each species. Though my definitions of noble-
ness and brutishness do not require this wider understanding, 
the traditional understanding of moral virtues is that moral 
virtues are behavioural-dispositions (specifically, those flowing 
from the passions) that contribute to a being’s flourishing (eu-
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damonia) and that moral vices are behavioural-dispositions that 
detract from a being’s flourishing. Different beings may have 
different flourishing-conditions depending on their nature. In 
many respects, flourishing for various other species that had the 
capacity required for moral agency might look different from 
human flourishing. Our actual use of vice and virtue terms for 
non-human animals seems to reflect this. That an elephant eats 
much more than us does not lead us to call it gluttonous, be-
cause for its flourishing the elephant’s nature prescribes eating 
much more than we do. 
Second, nobleness and brutishness concern the counterfac-
tual of whether the behavioural-disposition in question would 
contribute to a being’s flourishing if it had the capacity required 
for moral agency, not whether the behavioural-disposition con-
tributes to the being’s flourishing now. For instance, the conspe-
cific violence behaviours of meerkats (accounting for around a 
fifth of adult meerkat deaths (Gomez et al. 2016)) perhaps do in 
fact contribute to their flourishing, but in the event that these 
beings became moral agents we can imagine that this violence 
would not contribute to their flourishing, that conspecific vio-
lence should likely be proscribed by their society. This seems 
to be how we use terms of virtue and vice for human infants. 
Human infants lack the capacity required for moral agency and 
have many behavioural-dispositions that likely contribute to 
their flourishing. Nevertheless, we use terms of vice and virtue 
to describe these behavioural-dispositions in light of whether 
they will count as vices and virtues for the moral agents that 
the infants may become. Hence, behavioural-dispositions like 
excessive attention seeking, or excessive whining, or hitting 
others, are brutish for human infants. 
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Third, to say that non-human animals have the properties 
of nobleness and brutishness is not to say that counterfactually 
they have some property. Rather it is to say that they have some 
property, which property is defined by reference to something 
counterfactual (just as a property like a behavioural-disposi-
tion is defined by reference to something counterfactual). 
Fourth, not all behavioural-dispositions that would or should 
be transformed by the acquisition of the capacity required for 
moral agency count as noble or brutish, because those behav-
ioural-dispositions would not be virtues or vices, but rather 
something like etiquette (or lack thereof) or some other non-
moral excellence or failing. That pigs eat from the ground is not 
brutish even though we can suppose that pigs with the capacity 
required for moral agency would develop elaborate eating ritu-
als in the way that human beings have. 
Fifth, as with vice and virtue, some behavioural-dispositions 
instantiate the properties of nobility and brutishness more in-
tensely than others. A behavioural-disposition to run away 
from the great danger of a battle may be cowardly, but a be-
havioural-disposition to run away from the slightest danger is 
more cowardly. The behavioural-disposition of an adult grey 
seal to attack other adult grey seals may be brutish, but the 
behavioural-disposition of an adult grey seal to kill and can-
nibalize grey seal pups is more brutish. 
Sixth, as with vice and virtue, although plausibly every in-
dividual has some behavioural-dispositions that are noble and 
some that are brutish, overall judgments of whether a token 
non-human animal is noble or brutish can be made. Mussolini 
perhaps had many virtues but was clearly a vicious man rather 
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than a virtuous man. The grey seal described above perhaps 
has many noble properties but is clearly brutish.  
Seventh, as with virtue and vice, behaviours can fail to be 
noble or brutish because of their causal origin. For instance, 
if the grey seal described above has incurred brain damage 
from its head being smashed on a rock by a wave, or has been 
drugged by nefarious researchers, it is not brutish. The behav-
iours of the grey seal are to be attributed to some merely causal 
process going on in the seal, rather than attributed to the behav-
ioural-dispositions of its non-rational character. For instance, 
we can ask for what reason a brutish seal kills pups (freeing up 
resources for its own progeny? intimidating other seals?) just 
as we can ask for what reason two groups of chimpanzees fight 
with one another (for status, for food), but we cannot ask for 
what reason a brain-damaged or drugged seal kills pups – there 
is no reason. On the other hand, that this behaviour is typical 
for adult male grey seals, or that it results from some unex-
traordinary confluence of genetic and cultural causes, does not 
prevent it being brutish. 
Eighth, that it is not always clear whether some behavioural-
disposition counts as brutish or noble or not does not mean that 
there are not clear cases. It is perhaps not clear whether the 
behavioural-disposition of dogs to chase squirrels is brutish 
(should a society of rational dogs form a League Against Cruel 
Sports and proscribe this?). Nevertheless, it is clear that the be-
havioural-disposition of Hanuman langurs to conspecific infan-
ticide, accounting for over 30% of all infant deaths in one study 
(Borries 1997, 144), is brutish. It is clear that the behavioural-
disposition of male orangutans to forced copulation, accounting 
for 36% of all mating attempts in one study (Fox 2002, 95–96), 
is brutish.  
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Ninth, note that attributions of brutishness and nobleness 
are not the same as aesthetic attributions or attributions of 
usefulness-to-humans. Seeing snakes copulate is a sight that 
typically evokes disgust but not one that evokes attributions 
of brutishness. Dogs that have been trained to attack strangers 
are useful to their human trainers but brutish. So, appealing to 
these different attributions as a means of debunking attribu-
tions of nobleness and brutishness is not a plausible strategy 
on its face. 
I take it that with this account of nobleness and brutishness I 
have elucidated properties that we in fact encounter in experi-
ence, as when on the one hand we see one dog randomly attack-
ing another or as when on the other hand we see a mother-rat 
saving her pup from a snake.1
An additional reason for accepting that nobleness and brut-
ishness are real properties is that they make sense of the dis-
course of “innocence” that surrounds non-human animals. It 
is very common for those who object to factory farming to say 
that it is wrong because it harms non-human animals and be-
cause “animals are innocent.” The claim is plausible, if hard 
to make sense of at first. If “innocent” is taken in its ordinary 
sense (not guilty, not blameworthy, not worthy of punishment) 
then this is a strange thing to say. When a tree is cut down 
it is harmed and the tree is surely not guilty, blameworthy, or 
worthy of punishment. Yet even if one thinks that cutting down 
a tree is morally wrong because it harms the tree it would be 
strange to add “trees are innocent.” Likewise, if we imagine 
the case in which someone proposed killing the grey seal de-
scribed above it would seem strange, even to those who thought 
this would be morally wrong, to say “but he is innocent!,” even 
though the grey seal is not guilty, blameworthy, or worthy of 
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punishment. Rather, it seems that our saying that a non-human 
animal is “innocent” expresses the attribution that the non-hu-
man animal is noble. We do not say that the tree or the grey seal 
are innocent since neither are noble, the former by way of hav-
ing no behavioural-dispositions and the latter by way of having 
brutish behavioural-dispositions. 
Axiological Dimensions of Nobleness and 
Brutishness
The first pair of axiological claims I will argue for are (i) that 
nobleness is good, (ii) that brutishness is bad. That is, ceteris 
paribus the presence of nobleness makes a world more valu-
able, whilst ceteris paribus the presence of brutishness makes a 
world less valuable. I argue for these claims by suggesting that 
they explain our intuitive judgments about the overall value of 
three imagined worlds:
World Kalo contains only one species of animal, an 
animal that lacks the capacity required for moral agen-
cy, the Kalon. Kalons have many noble properties and 
no brutish properties. For instance, when one Kalon is 
sick other Kalons will forage food for it, when a Kalon 
dies other Kalons will care for its young. Conspecific 
violence, infanticide and forced-copulation have never 
been displayed by Kalons.  
World Therio contains only one species of animal, 
an animal that lacks the capacity required for moral 
agency, the Therion. Therions have no noble properties 
and many brutish properties. For instance, when one 
Therion is sick other Therions take food from its cache, 
when a Therion dies other Therions will cannibalize its 
young. Therions procreate exclusively through forced-
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copulation, and infanticide and conspecific violence 
are very common. 
World Meso contains only one species of animal, an 
animal that lacks the capacity required for moral agen-
cy, the Meson. Mesons have neither noble properties 
nor brutish properties. For instance, although Mesons 
are as sociable and intelligent as Kalons and Therions, 
they have a very unusual physiology which precludes 
one Meson being able to help or harm another and so 
Mesons do not have behavioural-dispositions toward 
such things.    
Let’s stipulate that in other axiological respects these worlds 
are the same – the total quantity and distribution among indi-
viduals of other valuable things like beauty, pleasure, knowl-
edge, and so forth, are the same, as is the number of individuals 
on each world, the biodiversity of the worlds, etc. Intuitive judg-
ment tells us that World Kalo contains more value than World 
Meso. Since the only axiological difference between World 
Kalo and World Meso is that the former contains nobleness, the 
only explanation for this intuitive judgment is that (i) is true. 
Intuitive judgment tells us that World Therio contains less val-
ue than World Meso. Since the only axiological difference be-
tween World Therio and World Meso is that the former contains 
brutishness, the only explanation for this intuitive judgment is 
that (ii) is true. The presence of the behavioral-dispositions that 
moral agency promotes is good, the presence of the behavioral-
dispositions that moral agency curbs and corrects is bad.
The second pair of axiological claims are (iii) that a non-
human animal lacks well-being and is noble is even worse than 
if that non-human animal lacked well-being and were not noble, 
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and (iv) that a non-human animal lacks well-being and is brut-
ish is not as bad as if that non-human animal lacked well-being 
and were not brutish. I argue for these claims in two ways: by 
suggesting that they explain intuitive judgments about a permu-
tation on these three worlds and by analogy with some similar 
axiological interactions between well-being and other proper-
ties. 
Consider again the three worlds described above, with the 
following addition:
Virus. One day a virus spreads through the Kalons/
Therions/Meson, causing each Kalon/Therion/Meson 
to lack well-being. For instance, each Kalon/Therion/
Meson is unable to properly digest its food for a week 
due to the virus and becomes malnourished. 
Here, intuitive judgment says that the value of World Kalo 
has undergone a greater decline than World Meso. Since the 
only difference between World Kalo and World Meso is that 
the non-human animals in the former are noble whilst the 
non-human animals in the latter are not, the only explanation 
for this intuitive judgment is that (iii) is true. Again, intuitive 
judgment says that the value of World Therio has undergone 
a lesser diminution of value than World Meso. Since the only 
difference between World Therio and World Meso is that the 
non-human animals in the former are brutish whilst the non-
human animals in the latter are not, the only explanation for 
this intuitive judgment is that (iv) is true. Note that this is not to 
deny that World Therio in Virus is now less valuable than it was 
because the brutish Therions now lack well-being, it is only to 
assert that World Kalo’s overall value has declined more than 
World Therio’s. We feel sadness and sympathy when we think 
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about the noble Kalons being malnourished, and we feel much 
less sadness and sympathy when we think about the brutish 
Therion’s being malnourished. Again, the charitable fundrais-
ing efforts that might be made for the suffering Kalons would 
surely eclipse any efforts made for the suffering Therions.
Well-being is a property that can be properly attributed to 
many things other than non-human animals (with varying de-
grees of philosophical dissent): human beings, plants (“That 
oak tree is flourishing”), social artefacts (“The City of Prague 
is flourishing,” “That trade union is not flourishing”), physical 
artefacts (“That car is not flourishing”). 
In these other cases, how bad the lack of well-being of these 
things is depends on their other properties. If a human being is 
virtuous, their lack of well-being is worse than if they were not 
virtuous. If a plant is beautiful, its lack of well-being is worse 
than if it were not beautiful. If a trade union is corrupt, its lack 
of well-being is not as bad as if it were free from corruption. If 
a car is common its lack of well-being is not as bad as if it were 
unique.
In each case intuitive judgment tells us that the coincidence 
of a lack of well-being with some good property (moral good-
ness, beauty, uniqueness) makes that lack of well-being even 
worse. Likewise, in each case intuitive judgment tells us that 
the coincidence of a lack of well-being with some bad prop-
erty (moral badness, ugliness, commonness) makes that lack of 
well-being less bad. So, by analogy the same should be true of 
the good property nobleness and the bad property brutishness, 
(iii) and (iv) should be true. 
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Moral Implications
What one sees the moral implications of (i-iv) as being will 
vary depending on what one’s preferred moral theory says 
about the relationship between the right and the good, and on 
empirical claims about where nobleness and brutishness are to 
be found. To draw some illustrative moral implications from (i-
iv) I will use as a model a simple consequentialist moral theory 
on which one has moral reason to perform an action in propor-
tion as it will promote aggregate value, with one having the 
most moral reason to perform the action that will maximize 
aggregate value. Similar but more complicated moral implica-
tions could be drawn on a wide range of moral theories, e.g., 
a deontological theory on which one has a defeasible duty to 
promote aggregate value.
On such a model, a moral implication of (i) – that nobleness 
is good – is that it gives additional moral reason to conserve 
many non-human animals, those that are noble. Elephants, it 
seems, are typically noble – they are not prone to conspecific 
violence or other obviously brutish behavioural-dispositions, 
and they display behavioural-dispositions towards their kin that 
among moral agents would count as a virtue like care (Leuthold 
and Leuthold 1975). So, when assessing the moral reasons we 
have to conserve elephants, we can add “that their nobleness 
is good” to the list of things about the existence of elephants 
that add value to the world, e.g. the pleasure they experience, 
their beauty, their knowledge, their contribution to biodiversity. 
Again, to the extent that such a thing is possible, (i) means that 
there is moral reason to cultivate the nobility of animals, e.g., 
training dogs to be gentle and patient, managing the social sys-
tems of chimpanzees in zoos and sanctuaries to encourage pro-
social behaviours (Funkhouser, Mayhew, and Mulcahy 2018).
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On such a model, a moral implication of (iii) – that a non-
human animal lacks well-being and is noble is even worse than 
if that non-human animal lacked well-being and were not noble 
– is that it gives an additional moral reason to refrain from prac-
tices that cause many non-human animals to lack well-being, 
most obviously factory farming. Cows, pigs, sheep, chickens, 
and other commonly factory farmed non-human animals seem 
in the main to either be noble or to not be obviously brutish. So 
far as I can discover, such beings do not engage in conspecific 
infanticide or have other obviously brutish behavioural-dispo-
sitions. Again, mother-cows and mother-pigs have behavioural-
dispositions towards their calves and piglets that among moral 
agents would count as a virtue like care (Algers and Uvnäs-Mo-
berg 2007; Smith Thomas 2011). So, when assessing the moral 
reasons that we have to refrain from agricultural practices like 
factory farming – that they make the world uglier, that they 
make non-human animals lack well-being – we can add that 
they make non-human animals that are noble lack well-being. 
As noted above, this makes sense of the idea that one reason 
why factory farming is especially wrong is that “animals are 
innocents.”
On such a model, the moral implications of (ii) and (iv) are 
roughly equivalent. Regarding (ii) we have some moral reason 
to remove brutishness from existence. Where possible, as with 
human infants or brutish dogs, we use all sorts of techniques 
of training to do this. Where this is not possible, it seems we 
have some slight reason to remove brutish animals from ex-
istence. This is not to say that we have all-things-considered 
reason to do so. Rather one might plausibly conclude that the 
bad brutishness even of Therios is outweighed by the value of 
good aspects of Therios such as the pleasure they experience, 
their contribution to biodiversity, and so forth. Regarding (iv) 
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we have less moral reason to refrain from practices that cause 
some non-human animals to lack well-being. This is not to say 
that (iv) gives us moral reason to engage in these practices. As 
an intuitive example, I have heard it remarked many times (to 
paraphrase) that fox hunting is not so wrong given that foxes 
are vicious, because they have a behavioural-disposition to sur-
plus killing, so-called “hen house syndrome” (Kossak 1989, 
510). 
With respect to the moral implications of (ii) and (iv) an 
anonymous referee raises the objection that:
“Domestic cats are disposed to killing birds, mice, and 
other animals even when they don’t need to do so for 
food. Many dogs are disposed to kill rabbits and squir-
rels if given the chance. So, it would follow from [the 
author’s] views that it is worse to cause cows, pigs, and 
chickens to suffer than it is to cause cats and dogs to 
suffer and that it’s worse to kill cows, pigs, and chick-
ens than it is to kill cats and dogs. I suspect that most 
readers of Between the Species will find that result un-
acceptable.”
I do think that the noted behavioural-dispositions are brut-
ish (granting that empirically cats and dogs have them), but to 
reach the conclusion that it is worse to cause a cow to suffer than 
it is to cause a cat or a dog to suffer we would have to form a 
fuller picture of the behavioural-dispositions of these animals. 
My golden retriever, Winnow, is inclined to chase squirrels, 
but she is also very friendly in her behaviour towards other 
dogs and towards people, which is noble. So, overall, Winnow 
is not clearly more brutish than a cow that has neither of these 
behavioural-dispositions, and so Winnow’s lacking well-being 
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is not less bad than a cow lacking well-being. I am inclined to 
happily bite any residue of a bullet. Some vegans feel conflicted 
about or reject cat guardianship given cat carnivorism (Clip-
sham 2017) and cat surplus killing behaviour (Abbate 2020; 
Fischer 2020). For the most part these feelings seem to be driv-
en by the concern that cat guardians are vicariously responsible 
for the bad effects that cats cause (the pain of birds, the death 
of birds). In addition, it seems that (ii) and (iv) play a role here. 
To take the extreme case, I suspect that most people would not 
want to become guardians of some Therios. It would be hard 
to delight in their behaviour, and hard to care about promoting 
their well-being, and hard to care about avoiding their suffering 
(things involved in good guardianship), because of how their 
brutishness informs the value of their well-being. 
In closing, I again emphasise that different moral theories 
will yield different moral implications here. Yet, barring the 
most extreme views that entirely divorce the right and the good, 
the axiological claims I have made about nobleness and brut-
ishness will have some moral implications for human practices 
that affect non-human animals. 
End notes
1An example of the brutish: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=-Ei9A6F-No0.
An example of the noble: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=3-NRKLGu7qk.
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